691 Soros says Europe "indirectly at war" with Russia; UKIP, Marine Le Pen & Orbán are allies of Putin

Soros says Europe "indirectly at war" with Russia; UKIP, Marine Le Pen &
Orbán are allies of Putin

Newsletter published on 24 October 2014

(1) Soros: UKIP, Marine Le Pen & Orbán are allies of Putin
(2) Soros tell Europe they are "indirectly at war" with Russia
(3) Putin restores 23,000 Orthodox churches
(4) Two billion rubles to restore holy sites, monasteries & churches
destroyed by Communism
(5) Putin: Orthodox Church is giving Russians a moral compass
(6) Russians embrace Orthodoxy for a Spiritual remedy after decades of
Communism
(7) Pussy Riot, and art exhibitions at Sakharov Museum, fall foul of
Hate law
(8) Russian parliament passes new blasphemy law as protesters call for
secular state
(9) Topless activist fined for exhibitionism in attack on Putin wax figure

(1) Soros: Russia (backed by UKIP, Marine Le Pen, & Orbán) an
"existential threat" to Europe

Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 02:54:27 +0900 From: chris lancenet
<chrislancenet@gmail.com>

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/23/george-soros-russia-threat-europe-vladimir-putin

George Soros: Russia poses existential threat to Europe

Investor says Vladimir Putin’s aggressive nationalism challenges values
and principles on which the EU was founded

Julian Borger

The Guardian, Thursday 23 October 2014 18.55 AEST

George Soros has warned that Russia’s expansionism poses an existential
threat to the EU and called for greater material support for Ukraine.

The investor and philanthropist argues that Vladimir Putin’s mix of
authoritarianism and aggressive nationalism represents an alternative
model to western liberal democracies, referring to the admiration for
the Russian president expressed by the Ukip leader, Nigel Farage, the
president of France’s Front National, Marine Le Pen, and Hungary’s prime
minister, Viktor Orbán.

“Europe is facing a challenge from Russia to its very existence. Neither
the European leaders nor their citizens are fully aware of this
challenge or know how best to deal with it,” Soros writes in an article
published in the New York Review of Books.

“Now Russia is presenting an alternative that poses a fundamental
challenge to the values and principles on which the European Union was
originally founded. It is based on the use of force that manifests
itself in repression at home and aggression abroad, as opposed to the
rule of law.”

Soros told the Guardian: “There is a general dissatisfaction with the EU
as a result of the euro crisis, which has perverted the initial impetus
for forming a union of like-minded democratic states. The euro crisis
was mishandled and lasted a long time, and it turned a voluntary union
of equals into something quite different.”

Soros said the EU had become a dysfunctional relationship between
creditor and debtor nations, resulting in widespread resentment. “Putin
has established good relations with those agitating against Europe,” he
said. “The failure of Europe as an experiment in supranational
government would make Russia a potent threat … The collapse of Ukraine
would be a tremendous loss for Nato, the European Union and the United
States. A victorious Russia would become much more influential within
the EU and pose a potent threat to the Baltic states with large ethnic
Russian populations.”

Soros, founder and chairman of the Open Society network of pro-democracy
foundations, predicts that after the elections in Ukraine on Sunday, the
Russian president will offer his Ukrainian counterpart, Petro
Poroshenko, a gas supply deal on condition he appoint a prime minister
acceptable to Putin. If that is refused, Putin “may then revert to the
smaller victory that would still be within his reach: he could open by
force a land route from Russia to Crimea and Transnistria [a pro-Moscow
breakaway statelet in Moldova] before winter”.

Soros calls for radically boosted western support of Ukraine with an
“immediate cash injection of at least $20bn with a promise of more when
needed” to help write off public debt, and help to reform the country’s
energy sector to make it less dependent on Russia. By assisting
Ukrainian reformers, he argues that the EU would be rediscovering its
founding principles. “The European Union would save itself by saving
Ukraine,” Soros said.

(2) Soros tell Europe they are "indirectly at war" with Russia

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/wake-up-europe/?insrc=hpss

Wake Up, Europe

George Soros

November 20, 2014 Issue
The following article will appear in The New York Review’s November 20
issue.

Europe is facing a challenge from Russia to its very existence. Neither
the European leaders nor their citizens are fully aware of this
challenge or know how best to deal with it. I attribute this mainly to
the fact that the European Union in general and the eurozone in
particular lost their way after the financial crisis of 2008.

The fiscal rules that currently prevail in Europe have aroused a lot of
popular resentment. Anti-Europe parties captured nearly 30 percent of
the seats in the latest elections for the European Parliament but they
had no realistic alternative to the EU to point to until recently. Now
Russia is presenting an alternative that poses a fundamental challenge
to the values and principles on which the European Union was originally
founded. It is based on the use of force that manifests itself in
repression at home and aggression abroad, as opposed to the rule of law.
What is shocking is that Vladimir Putin’s Russia has proved to be in
some ways superior to the European Union—more flexible and constantly
springing surprises. That has given it a tactical advantage, at least in
the near term.

Europe and the United States—each for its own reasons—are determined to
avoid any direct military confrontation with Russia. Russia is taking
advantage of their reluctance. Violating its treaty obligations, Russia
has annexed Crimea and established separatist enclaves in eastern
Ukraine. In August, when the recently installed government in Kiev
threatened to win the low-level war in eastern Ukraine against
separatist forces backed by Russia, President Putin invaded Ukraine with
regular armed forces in violation of the Russian law that exempts
conscripts from foreign service without their consent.

In seventy-two hours these forces destroyed several hundred of Ukraine’s
armored vehicles, a substantial portion of its fighting force. According
to General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for
Europe, the Russians used multiple launch rocket systems armed with
cluster munitions and thermobaric warheads (an even more inhumane weapon
that ought to be outlawed) with devastating effect.* The local militia
from the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk suffered the brunt of the
losses because they were communicating by cell phones and could thus
easily be located and targeted by the Russians. President Putin has, so
far, abided by a cease-fire agreement he concluded with Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko on September 5, but Putin retains the choice
to continue the cease-fire as long as he finds it advantageous or to
resume a full-scale assault.

In September, President Poroshenko visited Washington where he received
an enthusiastic welcome from a joint session of Congress. He asked for
“both lethal and nonlethal” defensive weapons in his speech. However,
President Obama refused his request for Javelin hand-held missiles that
could be used against advancing tanks. Poroshenko was given radar, but
what use is it without missiles? European countries are equally
reluctant to provide military assistance to Ukraine, fearing Russian
retaliation. The Washington visit gave President Poroshenko a façade of
support with little substance behind it.

Equally disturbing has been the determination of official international
leaders to withhold new financial commitments to Ukraine until after the
October 26 election there (which will take place just after this issue
goes to press). This has led to an avoidable pressure on Ukrainian
currency reserves and raised the specter of a full-blown financial
crisis in the country.

There is now pressure from donors, whether in Europe or the US, to “bail
in” the bondholders of Ukrainian sovereign debt, i.e., for bondholders
to take losses on their investments as a precondition for further
official assistance to Ukraine that would put more taxpayers’ money at
risk. That would be an egregious error. The Ukrainian government
strenuously opposes the proposal because it would put Ukraine into a
technical default that would make it practically impossible for the
private sector to refinance its debt. Bailing in private creditors would
save very little money and it would make Ukraine entirely dependent on
the official donors.

To complicate matters, Russia is simultaneously dangling carrots and
wielding sticks. It is offering—but failing to sign—a deal for gas
supplies that would take care of Ukraine’s needs for the winter. At the
same time Russia is trying to prevent the delivery of gas that Ukraine
secured from the European market through Slovakia. Similarly, Russia is
negotiating for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
to monitor the borders while continuing to attack the Donetsk airport
and the port city of Mariupol.

It is easy to foresee what lies ahead. Putin will await the results of
the elections on October 26 and then offer Poroshenko the gas and other
benefits he has been dangling on condition that he appoint a prime
minister acceptable to Putin. That would exclude anybody associated with
the victory of the forces that brought down the Viktor Yanukovych
government by resisting it for months on the Maidan—Independence Square.
I consider it highly unlikely that Poroshenko would accept such an
offer. If he did, he would be disowned by the defenders of the Maidan;
the resistance forces would then be revived.

Putin may then revert to the smaller victory that would still be within
his reach: he could open by force a land route from Russia to Crimea and
Transnistria before winter. Alternatively, he could simply sit back and
await the economic and financial collapse of Ukraine. I suspect that he
may be holding out the prospect of a grand bargain in which Russia would
help the United States against ISIS—for instance by not supplying to
Syria the S300 missiles it has promised, thus in effect preserving US
air domination—and Russia would be allowed to have its way in the “near
abroad,” as many of the nations adjoining Russia are called. What is
worse, President Obama may accept such a deal.

That would be a tragic mistake, with far-reaching geopolitical
consequences. Without underestimating the threat from ISIS, I would
argue that preserving the independence of Ukraine should take
precedence; without it, even the alliance against ISIS would fall apart.
The collapse of Ukraine would be a tremendous loss for NATO, the
European Union, and the United States. A victorious Russia would become
much more influential within the EU and pose a potent threat to the
Baltic states with their large ethnic Russian populations. Instead of
supporting Ukraine, NATO would have to defend itself on its own soil.
This would expose both the EU and the US to the danger they have been so
eager to avoid: a direct military confrontation with Russia. The
European Union would become even more divided and ungovernable. Why
should the US and other NATO nations allow this to happen?

The argument that has prevailed in both Europe and the United States is
that Putin is no Hitler; by giving him everything he can reasonably ask
for, he can be prevented from resorting to further use of force. In the
meantime, the sanctions against Russia—which include, for example,
restrictions on business transactions, finance, and trade—will have
their effect and in the long run Russia will have to retreat in order to
earn some relief from them.

These are false hopes derived from a false argument with no factual
evidence to support it. Putin has repeatedly resorted to force and he is
liable to do so again unless he faces strong resistance. Even if it is
possible that the hypothesis could turn out to be valid, it is extremely
irresponsible not to prepare a Plan B.

There are two counterarguments that are less obvious but even more
important. First, Western authorities have ignored the importance of
what I call the “new Ukraine” that was born in the successful resistance
on the Maidan. Many officials with a history of dealing with Ukraine
have difficulty adjusting to the revolutionary change that has taken
place there. The recently signed Association Agreement between the EU
and Ukraine was originally negotiated with the Yanukovych government.
This detailed road map now needs adjustment to a totally different
situation. For instance, the road map calls for the gradual replacement
and retraining of the judiciary over five years whereas the public is
clamoring for immediate and radical renewal. As the new mayor of Kiev,
Vitali Klitschko, put it, “If you put fresh cucumbers into a barrel of
pickles, they will soon turn into pickles.”

Contrary to some widely circulated accounts, the resistance on the
Maidan was led by the cream of civil society: young people, many of whom
had studied abroad and refused to join either government or business on
their return because they found both of them repugnant. (Nationalists
and anti-Semitic extremists made up only a minority of the
anti-Yanukovych protesters.) They are the leaders of the new Ukraine and
they are adamantly opposed to a return of the “old Ukraine,” with its
endemic corruption and ineffective government.

The new Ukraine has to contend with Russian aggression, bureaucratic
resistance both at home and abroad, and confusion in the general
population. Surprisingly, it has the support of many oligarchs,
President Poroshenko foremost among them, and the population at large.
There are of course profound differences in history, language, and
outlook between the eastern and western parts of the country, but
Ukraine is more united and more European-minded than ever before. That
unity, however, is extremely fragile.

The new Ukraine has remained largely unrecognized because it took time
before it could make its influence felt. It had practically no security
forces at its disposal when it was born. The security forces of the old
Ukraine were actively engaged in suppressing the Maidan rebellion and
they were disoriented this summer when they had to take orders from a
government formed by the supporters of the rebellion. No wonder that the
new government was at first unable to put up an effective resistance to
the establishment of the separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine. It is
all the more remarkable that President Poroshenko was able, within a few
months of his election, to mount an attack that threatened to reclaim
those enclaves.

To appreciate the merits of the new Ukraine you need to have had some
personal experience with it. I can speak from personal experience
although I must also confess to a bias in its favor. I established a
foundation in Ukraine in 1990 even before the country became
independent. Its board and staff are composed entirely of Ukrainians and
it has deep roots in civil society. I visited the country often,
especially in the early years, but not between 2004 and early 2014, when
I returned to witness the birth of the new Ukraine.

I was immediately impressed by the tremendous improvement in maturity
and expertise during that time both in my foundation and in civil
society at large. Currently, civic and political engagement is probably
higher than anywhere else in Europe. People have proven their
willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country. These are the
hidden strengths of the new Ukraine that have been overlooked by the West.

The other deficiency of the current European attitude toward Ukraine is
that it fails to recognize that the Russian attack on Ukraine is
indirectly an attack on the European Union and its principles of
governance. It ought to be evident that it is inappropriate for a
country, or association of countries, at war to pursue a policy of
fiscal austerity as the European Union continues to do. All available
resources ought to be put to work in the war effort even if that
involves running up budget deficits. The fragility of the new Ukraine
makes the ambivalence of the West all the more perilous. Not only the
survival of the new Ukraine but the future of NATO and the European
Union itself is at risk. In the absence of unified resistance it is
unrealistic to expect that Putin will stop pushing beyond Ukraine when
the division of Europe and its domination by Russia is in sight.

Having identified some of the shortcomings of the current approach, I
will try to spell out the course that Europe ought to follow. Sanctions
against Russia are necessary but they are a necessary evil. They have a
depressive effect not only on Russia but also on the European economies,
including Germany. This aggravates the recessionary and deflationary
forces that are already at work. By contrast, assisting Ukraine in
defending itself against Russian aggression would have a stimulative
effect not only on Ukraine but also on Europe. That is the principle
that ought to guide European assistance to Ukraine.

Germany, as the main advocate of fiscal austerity, needs to understand
the internal contradiction involved. Chancellor Angela Merkel has
behaved as a true European with regard to the threat posed by Russia.
She has been the foremost advocate of sanctions on Russia, and she has
been more willing to defy German public opinion and business interests
on this than on any other issue. Only after the Malaysian civilian
airliner was shot down in July did German public opinion catch up with
her. Yet on fiscal austerity she has recently reaffirmed her allegiance
to the orthodoxy of the Bundesbank—probably in response to the electoral
inroads made by the Alternative for Germany, the anti-euro party. She
does not seem to realize how inconsistent that is. She ought to be even
more committed to helping Ukraine than to imposing sanctions on Russia.

The new Ukraine has the political will both to defend Europe against
Russian aggression and to engage in radical structural reforms. To
preserve and reinforce that will, Ukraine needs to receive adequate
assistance from its supporters. Without it, the results will be
disappointing and hope will turn into despair. Disenchantment already
started to set in after Ukraine suffered a military defeat and did not
receive the weapons it needs to defend itself.

It is high time for the members of the European Union to wake up and
behave as countries indirectly at war. They are better off helping
Ukraine to defend itself than having to fight for themselves. One way or
another, the internal contradiction between being at war and remaining
committed to fiscal austerity has to be eliminated. Where there is a
will, there is a way.

Let me be specific. In its last progress report, issued in early
September, the IMF estimated that in a worst-case scenario Ukraine would
need additional support of $19 billion. Conditions have deteriorated
further since then. After the Ukrainian elections the IMF will need to
reassess its baseline forecast in consultation with the Ukrainian
government. It should provide an immediate cash injection of at least
$20 billion, with a promise of more when needed. Ukraine’s partners
should provide additional financing conditional on implementation of the
IMF-supported program, at their own risk, in line with standard practice.

The spending of borrowed funds is controlled by the agreement between
the IMF and the Ukrainian government. Four billion dollars would go to
make up the shortfall in Ukrainian payments to date; $2 billion would be
assigned to repairing the coal mines in eastern Ukraine that remain
under the control of the central government; and $2 billion would be
earmarked for the purchase of additional gas for the winter. The rest
would replenish the currency reserves of the central bank.

The new assistance package would include a debt exchange that would
transform Ukraine’s hard currency Eurobond debt (which totals almost $18
billion) into long-term, less risky bonds. This would lighten Ukraine’s
debt burden and bring down its risk premium. By participating in the
exchange, bondholders would agree to accept a lower interest rate and
wait longer to get their money back. The exchange would be voluntary and
market-based so that it could not be mischaracterized as a default.
Bondholders would participate willingly because the new long-term bonds
would be guaranteed—but only partially—by the US or Europe, much as the
US helped Latin America emerge from its debt crisis in the 1980s with
so-called Brady bonds (named for US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady).

Such an exchange would have a few important benefits. One is that, over
the next two or three critical years, the government could use
considerably less of its scarce hard currency reserves to pay off
bondholders. The money could be used for other urgent needs.

By trimming Ukraine debt payments in the next few years, the exchange
would also reduce the chance of a sovereign default, discouraging
capital flight and arresting the incipient run on the banks. This would
make it easier to persuade owners of Ukraine’s banks (many of them
foreign) to inject urgently needed new capital into them. The banks
desperately need bigger capital cushions if Ukraine is to avoid a
full-blown banking crisis, but shareholders know that a debt crisis
could cause a banking crisis that wipes out their equity.

Finally, Ukraine would keep bondholders engaged rather than watch them
cash out at 100 cents on the dollar as existing debt comes due in the
next few years. This would make it easier for Ukraine to reenter the
international bond markets once the crisis has passed. Under the current
conditions it would be more practical and cost-efficient for the US and
Europe not to use their own credit directly to guarantee part of
Ukraine’s debt, but to employ intermediaries such as the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development or the World Bank and its subsidiaries.

The Ukrainian state-owned company Naftogaz is a black hole in the budget
and a major source of corruption. Naftogaz currently sells gas to
households for $47 per thousand cubic meters (TCM), for which it pays
$380 per TCM. At present people cannot control the temperature in their
apartments. A radical restructuring of Naftogaz’s entire system could
reduce household consumption at least by half and totally eliminate
Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for gas. That would involve charging
households the market price for gas. The first step would be to install
meters in apartments and the second to distribute a cash subsidy to
needy households.

The will to make these reforms is strong both in the new management and
in the incoming government but the task is extremely complicated (how do
you define who is needy?) and the expertise is inadequate. The World
Bank and its subsidiaries could sponsor a project development team that
would bring together international and domestic experts to convert the
existing political will into bankable projects. The initial cost would
exceed $10 billion but it could be financed by project bonds issued by
the European Investment Bank and it would produce very high returns.

It is also high time for the European Union to take a critical look at
itself. There must be something wrong with the EU if Putin’s Russia can
be so successful even in the short term. The bureaucracy of the EU no
longer has a monopoly of power and it has little to be proud of. It
should learn to be more united, flexible, and efficient. And Europeans
themselves need to take a close look at the new Ukraine. That could help
them recapture the original spirit that led to the creation of the
European Union. The European Union would save itself by saving Ukraine.

—October 23, 2014

    1. *       I am deeply disturbed by a report in The New York Times
quoting Human Rights Watch that subsequently—on October 2 and
5—Ukrainians also used cluster bombs, which I condemn. NATO should
clarify both alleged Ukrainian and Russian use of such munitions.

(3) Putin restores 23,000 Orthodox churches

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-vladimir-putin-helped-resurrect-the-russian-orthodox-church/article16361650/

How Vladimir Putin helped resurrect the Russian Orthodox Church ...

Mark MacKinnon

YEKATERINBURG, RUSSIA — The Globe and Mail

Published Wednesday, Jan. 15 2014, 9:53 PM EST

Last updated Thursday, Jan. 16 2014, 8:33 AM EST

Tamara Leontieva’s voice fills with pain as she talks about the darkest
day faced by her Russian Orthodox Church. “This is the place where the
Tsar and his whole family were killed,” the guide whispers dramatically
as we approach the dimly lit altar of the Church on the Blood, built
where Nicholas II, the last of the Romanov tsars, and his family were
murdered in 1918.

Worshipers at kiss the cross held by Priest Alexei Kulberg during
service at The Bolshoi Zlatoust Church (translates as the "Big (or
Great) Chrysostom" Church) in Yekaterinburg, Russia January 15, 2014.
Worshipers at kiss the cross held by Priest Alexei Kulberg during
service at The Bolshoi Zlatoust Church (translates as the "Big (or
Great) Chrysostom" Church) in Yekaterinburg, Russia January 15, 2014.
The Globe and Mail

Until his death at the hands of Bolsheviks, Nicholas II was viewed by
the Russian Orthodox faithful as the divinely appointed head of an
empire that stretched from Poland to the Pacific Ocean. On the day he
died, a sacred icon that had gone missing centuries earlier is said to
have reappeared in Moscow, a signal to believers that God’s chosen ruler
was gone.

Ms. Leontieva calls what followed “the turmoils.” But the Russian
Orthodox Church outlasted the official atheism of the Soviet Union and
now, after almost a century in the wilderness, has regained most of the
power and prestige it enjoyed under the Romanovs.

Many in the church credit that to a man they believe may also be
inspired from above: President Vladimir Putin. “Even his family name
comes from the church,” Ms. Leontieva says with admiration. (The first
syllable – pronounced “poot” – means “the path” or “the way” in Russian.)

Over 15 years as either president or prime minister of the Russian
Federation, Mr. Putin has left his mark – and a trail of megaprojects –
around this vast country. The Winter Olympics that begin in less than
three weeks are the latest monument to the Putin era, with the host city
of Sochi overhauled for the occasion at a startling cost of more than
$50-billion.

Long before he turned his attention to such international celebrations,
Mr. Putin oversaw the resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church,
including the reconstruction of some 23,000 Churches that had been
destroyed or fallen into disuse. The Church on the Blood is not included
in that count, since it’s a completely new house of worship, completed
in 2003.

To the delight of the church leadership, Mr. Putin’s policies have also
taken a sharply conservative turn since his return to the Kremlin last
year for a third term as President. Once viewed as a liberal, Mr. Putin
has in the past 12 months embraced the church’s positions on such
sensitive issues as abortion and gay rights.

“There are no conflicts between the church and the state,” smiles Father
Alexey Kulberg, an outspoken priest in Yekaterinburg, this city of 1.4
million near the Ural Mountains that separate Russia into its European
and Asian halves. “The President’s ideology for developing Russia
coincides with the direction of the Russian Orthodox Church.”

In other words, while the church doesn’t quite recognize Mr. Putin as
chosen by God, it’s quite happy with the job he’s doing.

On the surface, it seems an odd match. Mr. Putin, after all, was a
long-time member of the KGB, the organization that spearheaded the
Soviet Union’s repression of “counter-revolutionary” entities such as
the church.

But Mr. Putin is that rare KGB agent who was baptized, in secret, as a
child. Meanwhile, the head of the church, Patriarch Kirill, has been
publicly accused of working for the KGB during the Soviet era.

Both the Kremlin and the church have benefited from resuming their
centuries-old alliance. Early in Mr. Putin’s rule, a law was passed
returning all church property that had been seized during the Soviet
era, almost surely making the Moscow Patriarchate the largest landowner
in Russia. State-owned energy companies have contributed billions of
rubles to the reconstruction of Churches around the country.

Mr. Putin has made a proud show of his own faith, and the church has
rewarded him with robust support in times of need. As street protests
swelled in 2012 against Mr. Putin’s return to the presidency, Patriarch
Kirill declared on television that “liberalism will lead to legal
collapse and then the apocalypse.” Mr. Putin’s rule was a “miracle,” the
patriarch said on another occasion.

In a country where 90 per cent of the population self-identifies as
Russian Orthodox (though 30 per cent also say they’re atheists, giving
rise to the term “Orthodox atheist”), that intervention unquestionably
helped quiet calls for change in the Kremlin.

Those same street protests – and the belief among Mr. Putin’s inner
circle that the demonstrators were aided and abetted by Western
governments – further cemented the Kremlin-church alliance. Mr. Putin
increasingly speaks of Russia as a civilization distinct from the West.
It’s a view shared by the church, which blames “Western influence” for
the spread of liberal ideas, like gay rights, in Russia.

The church has loudly supported the “anti-homosexual propaganda” law
that Mr. Putin signed last year (which prohibits the publication of any
material portraying lesbians, gays, bisexual or transgendered people as
normal), as well as a Kremlin move to ban the advertising of abortion
services.

“The church and the state are moving toward separating Russia from the
West,” said Anna Gizulinna, a 52-year-old transgendered university
lecturer who says she has faced increasing persecution at work since the
passing of the anti-propaganda law. “They see the West as a danger and
say they’re fighting to save Russian souls.”

She, like many LGBT Russians, fears Mr. Putin’s assault on gay rights
has only paused for the Sochi Olympics. There’s an expectation that the
social conservative march will resume once the athletes, and the
international media, are gone.

Father Alexey hopes that’s true. Sitting in his office under a portrait
of the murdered Romanovs (the Russian Orthodox Church now considers
Nicholas II a martyred saint), he says he’d like to see the country
return to the “theocratic values” of tsarist times. He believes Mr.
Putin might be the man to guide Russia there.

“I don’t want to idealize the President, but I can understand Putin’s
words and Putin’s decisions,” Father Alexey said, fingering the large
gold cross hanging from his neck. “As a citizen, I trust him.”

(4) Two billion rubles to restore holy sites, monasteries & churches
destroyed by Communism

http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Orthodox-Christmas-strengthens-alliance-between-Putin-and-Patriarch-Kirill-17280.html

01/07/2010

Orthodox Christmas strengthens alliance between Putin and Patriarch Kirill

Church and state work closer together for a strong and united Russia.
The government announces two billion rubles to restore holy places
destroyed by Communism. The old Novodevichy Convent is set to be
returned to the Church. Kirill blesses the actions by Putin and the
government in tackling the economic crisis.

Moscow (AsiaNews) – More than 150 million Russian Orthodox Christians
and 30,000 Russian Orthodox Churches celebrated Christmas today around
the world. In Moscow for the first time since he took over from the late
Aleksij II, Patriarch Kirill celebrated Midnight Mass in the traditional
Vigil liturgy in Saint Christ the Saviour Cathedral in the presence of
4,000 people, including Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

The Russian Orthodox Church celebrates Christmas following the old
Julian calendar, which is 13 days "behind" the Gregorian calendar
adopted by the Catholic, Protestant and some Orthodox Churches as well
as the secular world.

In Russia, 7 January also marks the end of the period of abstinence from
eating meat and sweets and drinking alcoholic beverages that began on 28
November. It is also a national holiday, and a time when security forces
are on maximum alert as a result of recent terrorist attacks around the
world. Some 8,500 police agents have been deployed in the capital until
tonight to ensure order and security.

Christmas is also a time when secular and religious worlds come
together. For the past five years, this has meant growing ties between
political and Church leaders. Both have used the occasion to tell the
nation about their ever closer relationship for a stronger and more
united Russia.

This year, in addition to the traditional exchange of wishes and thanks
with the Patriarchate of Moscow, the Russian government gave the Church
a special Christmas gift. In his meeting with the patriarch at the
Danilov Monastery, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that
the government would provide RUB 2 billion (US$ 63 million) to restore
holy sites, monasteries and churches destroyed during last century's
atheist drive by the state against religion. He also said that the
Novodevichy Convent, one of most beautiful and important in the country,
would be returned to the Patriarchate before the end of the year.

Putin praised the Church for "educating citizens in a spirit of
patriotism and love of country, passing on love for spiritual values and
history." For his part, Kirill said that he hoped that the Lord would
help Putin "in performing the high task God gave him." The patriarch
also praised the prime minister for the way he managed the economic
crisis, which has had a greater impact in Russia than elsewhere in the
world.

In his message to the Orthodox community on Christmas Eve, Kirill
stressed the "unity of Holy Russia". Going over the various trips he
took in his first year as patriarch, he explained that it is through
"the strength of faith in a multiethnic society" that transcend "ethnic
and social differences" that Russia will be able to maintain "its
spiritual unity" in today's world.

Funding to restore Christian sites and the return of properties seized
from the Church in Soviet times are but the latest gift of the Kremlin
to the Patriarchate. This year, Russia's Justice Ministry is set to
present plans to amend the federal law on "Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Organisations", which, if approved, would severely restrict
the activities of certain religious communities, like Evangelical
Christians.

In addition, the authorities plan to add religious education in public
schools as well as chaplains paid by the state to the armed forces. It
also appears possible that the Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow will be
granted the right to vet parliamentary bills before they go to the Duma.

This would indicate that now laws might have to be blessed before they
are approved.

(5) Putin: Orthodox Church is giving Russians a moral compass

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/25/putin-hosts-world-orthodox-leaders-at-unique-gathering/

Putin hosts world's Orthodox leaders at unique gathering
AFP

By Anna Smolchenko

Published July 25, 2013

MOSCOW (AFP) –  President Vladimir Putin praised close ties between the
Kremlin and the powerful Orthodox Church as he hosted top Orthodox
clergy from across the world Thursday to mark the 1025th anniversary of
the arrival of Christianity in Russia.

Convening the heads and senior members of 15 Orthodox Churches for an
unprecedented meeting at the Kremlin, Putin praised the moral authority
of the Church as he seeks to strengthen his power following huge
protests against his 13-year rule.

"It is important that relations between the state and the church are
developing at a new level," Putin said in televised remarks, with
Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill by his side.

"We act as genuine partners and colleagues to solve the most pressing
domestic and international tasks, to implement joint initiatives for the
benefit of our country and people," he told the black-robed clerics.

Alongside Kirill, those present included Patriarch Theodore II of
Alexandria, Theophilos III of Jerusalem and Ilia II of Georgia, the
Kremlin said.

Also present were the heads of the Bulgarian, Serbian, Polish and
Cypriot Orthodox Churches. Together they represented more than 227
million faithful.

Conspicuously, however, the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew I did not go to the meeting and was represented by a
lower-ranking cleric.

The Russian Orthodox Church was suppressed under Communism but has
staged an astonishing recovery in post-Soviet Russia to become one of
the country's most powerful institutions.

Putin, an ex-KGB agent who has said his mother had him secretly
christened in the Soviet Union, has enjoyed unstinting support from the
Church throughout his years in power, including during the unprecedented
protests that broke out in Moscow and other big cities in the winter of
2011.

Since returning to the presidency for a third term last year, Putin has
been promoting an unflinchingly conservative agenda in a move aimed at
cementing his support among blue-collar workers and elderly Russians,
his core backers.

This summer Russia's parliament passed a law imposing jail terms of up
to three years on those who offend religious believers.

The controversial bill was proposed after several members of rock band
Pussy Riot belted out a "punk prayer" against Putin and his close ties
with the Church last year.

Two Pussy Riot members, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina, are
now serving two years in a penal colony after being convicted last
August on charges of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.

The Russian parliament also adopted a law imposing jail terms for people
promoting homosexual "propaganda" to minors, while another recently
adopted law bans gay and lesbian couples in foreign countries from
adopting Russian children.

Putin said Thursday that the Church was giving Russians a moral compass
when so many were looking for help.

"Today when people are once again searching for moral support, millions
of our compatriots see it in religion," Putin said. "They trust the
wise, pastoral word of the Russian Orthodox Church."

Historian Alexei Beglov said Putin was the first Russian leader to have
convened so many heads of Orthodox Churches, calling the meeting a
"political gesture."

But he said it was not appropriate to speak of the coalescence of church
and state in Russia, noting Putin was simply using the Church to advance
his political goals.

"Putin is trying to exploit the Orthodox religion to strengthen the
authoritarian system," added Vladimir Oivin of credo.ru, an online
portal writing about religion.

"The regime is wobbling, and they are looking at how to strengthen it."

Accompanied by Patriarch Kirill, Putin is set to travel to neighbouring
Ukraine at the weekend to meet his counterpart Viktor Yanukovych and
attend ceremonies marking the anniversary of Christianity.

(6) Russians embrace Orthodoxy for a Spiritual remedy after decades of
Communism

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/philosophicalfragments/2014/04/02/understanding-a-more-religious-and-assertive-russia/

Understanding a More Religious and Assertive Russia

April 2, 2014

By Mark Tooley

In his widely analyzed March 18 speech to the Russian Parliament, Putin
cited the baptism of Vladimir the Great over 1000 years ago in Crimea as
the seminal event binding Ukraine and Russia. That baptism is considered
the birth of Russian Orthodoxy. Orthodox faith has been key to Moscow’s
historic self conceived role as defender of all Russians, of Slavs, and
of Orthodox, wherever they are.

Putin has formed a close association with Russian Orthodoxy, as Russian
rulers typically have across centuries. He is smart to do so, as Russia
has experienced somewhat of a spiritual revival. Although regular church
goers remain a small minority, strong majorities of Russians now
identify as Orthodox. Orthodoxy is widely and understandably seen as the
spiritual remedy to the cavernous spiritual vacuum left by over 70
disastrous, often murderous years of Bolshevism.

Resurgent religious traditionalism has fueled Russia’s new law against
sexual orientation proselytism to minors and its new anti-abortion law.
Both laws also respond to Russia’s demographic struggle with plunging
birth rates and monstrously high abortion rates that date to Soviet
rule. Some American religious conservatives have looked to Russian
religious leaders as allies in international cooperation on pro-family
causes.

It remains to be seen whether geopolitical tensions over Putin’s moves
in Russia temper this alliance. A few liberal commentators have
predictably denounced it as toxic. A few conservative commentators have
cautioned against saber rattling against Russia, whose religious revival
they hope might counter Western secularism. A realistic perspective
should welcome Christian vitality in Russia while recognizing it won’t
necessarily mitigate and may in fact reinforce Russia as a strategic
competitor with the West. East-West rivalry predates Soviet Communism by
a millennium.

Historically Moscow politically and religiously has understood itself as
the “third Rome” and the natural successor to Constantinople as
protector of Orthodox civilization. The formal schism between Eastern
and Western churches a thousand years ago created an unhealed
civilizational divide. Western powers have periodically sought Russian
alliance against common foes. But just as often Western powers have
warred with or at least sought to contain Russia.

The “great game” of which Rudyard Kipling wrote described Britain’s
ongoing designs to keep Czarist Russia away from South Asia and warm
water ports. [...]

(7) Pussy Riot, and art exhibitions at Sakharov Museum, fall foul of
Hate law

http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/01/religion-rules-in-russia/

  Religion rules in Russia

Why does freedom of religion and belief continue to cause conflict in
post-Soviet Russia?

By Alexander Verkhovsky / 22 January, 2014

{photo}
Pussy Riot supporters prevented from praying for Putin’s resignation
outside the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow    (Image: Anton
Belitskiy / Demotix)
{end photo}

Two issues preoccupying post-Soviet society are a wish to oppose outside
influences (mainly from the West), and to resist aggressive behaviour in
matters of religion. It is not difficult to point out inconsistencies
and contradictions in these approaches, but more germane is the fact
that both have survived, if in modified form, to the present day. When
the possibility of further restrictions on freedom of conscience are
being discussed, a key topic is invariably the need to protect society
from the “expansionism” of new religious movements and radical Islam.

The arrests of members of the Pussy Riot punk band after their
performance outside Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour proved a
powerful catalyst for both these concerns. The protest was seen as a
frontal attack on “tradition” by “pro-Western forces” (the actual point
Pussy Riot wanted to make was neither here nor there), and as an attack
on the religious sensibilities of the “Orthodox majority”. The reaction
was accordingly heavy-handed, including not only imprisonment of two
members of the group, but also the passing of a law criminalising the
“offending of believers’ religious sensibilities”, often referred to as
the “blasphemy” law. [...]

Among the first major “anti-extremist” trials associated with religion
were those targeting contemporary art exhibitions at the Andrey Sakharov
Museum, which presaged the Pussy Riot case. Also, in 2011, a journalist
was convicted for making rude remarks about believers in general, and
the clergy in particular, even though his was not by any means a high
profile protest and could not be represented as involving incitement to
hatred against any group. Lastly, over several years there has been a
serious campaign of criminal prosecution against people who read or
distribute the works of a Sufi teacher, the late Said Nursi, even though
neither he nor his Russian followers have links to terrorism, or engage
in conduct which might constitute a threat to society.

In the case of the Sakharov museum exhibitions, the general public could
at least understand more clearly what was going on. Some might consider
the exhibition a profound artistic meditation on relations between the
church and society; others might see the exhibits as an amusing send-up
of the church and/or orthodoxy; some might consider it a send-up in bad
taste or even an attack on the church, but within acceptable limits of
freedom of expression; others, however, were determined to prove that
the exhibition was a criminal incitement to hatred of orthodoxy and
Orthodox Christians. [...]

  Translated by Arch Tait

(8) Russian parliament passes new blasphemy law as protesters call for
secular state

http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2013/06/russian-parliament-passes-new-blasphemy-law-as-protesters-call-for-secular-state

Posted: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 15:20

Russia's parliament has overwhelmingly approved a new blasphemy law
allowing jail sentences of up to three years for "offending religious
feelings", an initiative launched in the wake of the trial against the
anti-Kremlin punk band Pussy Riot.

Under the proposed new law, Russian citizens would face a year in jail
for "intentional" and "public" displays that cause "offense to religious
sensibilities," and up to three years in jail for desecrating religious
sites and paraphernalia".

Mikhail Markelov, a member of the ruling United Russia party, said: "We
are not talking about the subjective term 'religious offense', which is
admittedly difficult to qualify. The law only punishes public acts that
obviously go out of their way to insult a religion." She said the new
law has been "chiseled to perfection, and reflects the desires of the
majority of our society."

The Russian parliament, the Duma, will hear a third and final reading in
the next week. If approved, it will then go to President Putin for final
approval.

The Duma this week also unanimously passed a federal law banning gay
"propaganda" – imposing heavy fines for providing information about
homosexuality to people under 18. Together, the two laws are intended to
boost the power of the Russian Orthodox Church, which professes total
allegiance to the state.

In a recent public address President Vladimir Putin praised the special
role that the church plays in the society. "The church incessantly cares
about strengthening high moral and ethical ideals and family traditions
in society, and the younger generation's upbringing. The church does a
lot to solve pressing social problems," said Putin.

International rights groups have called the current situation in Russia
the worst human rights climate in the post-Soviet era.

Meanwhile, in the city of Tomsk, protesters have gathered for a rally
for a secular state and freedom of conscience.

This rally's co-organiser Andrei Verkhov called for top-ranking
officials to adhere to the constitution so that religion is not imposed.
"It [the constitution] says that no religion shall enjoy preferences but
we can see that the authorities breach the constitution by granting
preferences to worshippers," Verkhov said.

Protesters carried signs calling for the abolition of religious subjects
in schools.

(9) Topless activist fined for exhibitionism in attack on Putin wax figure

http://af.reuters.com/article/oddlyEnoughNews/idAFKCN0I416O20141015

Wed Oct 15, 2014 2:24pm GMT

PARIS (Reuters) - A Ukrainian activist belonging to topless feminist
group Femen was convicted for exhibitionism by a Paris court on
Wednesday for having attacked a statue of Russian President Vladimir
Putin at a wax museum in the capital.

Iana Zhdanova, with "Kill Putin" written on her nude breasts, attacked
the likeness of Putin at the Musee Grevin in the capital with a wooden
stake in June.

The activist, who has lived in France for two years as a political
refugee, laughed in court after the judge ordered her to pay fine of
1,500 euros ($1,897) (1,187 pound) for vandalism and a crime called
"sexual exhibition" in French, as well as other damages payable to Musee
Grevin.

"I'm laughing because it's very strange," said Zhdanova, 26, outside the
courtroom. "I'm very surprised by this decision."

Zhdanova's lawyer, Marie Dose, said it was the first time a French court
had sentenced a Femen member for sexual exhibition, calling it a
precedent that would thwart the group's ability to protest. Dose said
she would appeal.

Femen specialises in shock bare-breast appearances to dramatise women's
rights causes, mainly in the male-dominated hierarchies of Russia and
its former Soviet allies, with Putin a particular target.

"In a society like ours where the display of (sexual) commercial
messages is everywhere, it makes no sense," Dose said.

The wax statue of Putin fell over during the attack, a part of the head
shattering. It has since been repaired.

Most recently, a court acquitted nine members of Femen who staged a
topless protest inside Notre Dame Cathedral last year.

(Reporting By Chine Labbe, Writing by Alexandria Sage; Editing by Andrew
Callus)